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After reading the latest offering from Gananath Obeyesekere, Imagining Karma: Ethical 
Transformation in Amerindian, Buddhist, and Greek Rebirth, I am once again 
thoroughly impressed by the author's exhaustive command of his material and the ease 
with which he engages scholars from such a diversity of fields as anthropology, 
religious studies, classics, and Indology. Obeyesekere proves that even for a 
psychoanalytically oriented anthropologist of South Asia, the literatures and cultures of 
Amerindians and classical Greeks are available to the painstakingly committed scholar. 
Admittedly overwhelmed on occasion by the sheer volume of evidence cited in support 
of his analysis of ethicization in such disparate cultural milieus, I commend 
Obeyesekere for such a well-researched and persuasive presentation.  
 
My training in South Asian studies and religious studies compels me to forego any 
serious commenting upon the Amerindian and Greek material; that being said, I can 
also go ahead and state that I am in agreement with much of Obeyesekere's analysis of 
the Hindu, Buddhist, and ajivaka material. Accordingly, my comments will not focus on 
the historical-ethnographical material as such. Rather, I want to address a couple of 
methodological points and attempt a little imagining of my own. To be precise, I first 
want to address Obeyesekere's most-welcomed foray into comparative studies and the 
import this has for the methodological debates in the study of religion. Second, I want to 
ask some psychoanalytically motivated questions. I believe the latter task rides the 
coattails of the former.  
 
Certainly we have all become familiar with the debates and polemics surrounding the 
topics of Orientalism and postcolonialism. Ever since the 1978 publication of Edward 
Said's Orientalism, scholars (particularly Western) have been consistently reminded of 
the dissymmetry, and concomitant power, associated with the cross-cultural encounter. 
Within the narrower field of Hindu studies alone, debates continue to rage over such 
questions as, "Who speaks for Hinduism?"
1 
We hear repeatedly the criticism that the 
Western scholar systematically (even if seemingly innocently) distorts the "worldview" of 
Hindu peoples. Especially in such "suspect" fields as psychoanalysis, tempers flare and 
dismissals abound. Of course we can point here to the troubles and heated exchanges 
regarding Jeffrey J. Kripal's Kali's Child. The Western scholar simply has no unbiased 
access to these other worlds and thus misrepresents when attempting to represent, or 
so the argument goes. This of course approaches the much larger question of the 
insider's versus the outsider's voice, the ernie versus the etic. Particularly in religious 
studies, the latter analyses are referred to with that most baleful of designations, 
reductionism. Indeed, it would appear that the r-word arises almost automatically 
anytime a piece of scholarship (if we can even use this term, a point hotly contested in 
regard to such works as Kali's Child) attempts to move beyond the merely descriptive. 
Phenomenology and hermeneutics displace the critical. The concern not to offend (itself 
perhaps a symptom of a postcolonial guilt) effectively erects boundaries between 
cultures such that only the insider's voice is authoritative. According to Obeyesekere, 
this leads to an ethnographic privilege, if not prejudice (xx) that potentially ruins the 
comparative project.
2 
In this regard, I applaud Obeyesekere's will-to-imagine, that is, his 
will to construct nomological models, itself a departure from the thick descriptions that 
beg the "so what" question. Non-theoretical descriptions are simply uninteresting.  
 
Aware of the sensitivity of this issue, I want to look at Obeyesekere's position a bit 
more in depth, especially with regard to religious studies, and then I want to press the 
psychoanalytic position. I pursue the latter because throughout Imagining Karma 
Obeyesekere drops hints at psychoanalytic interpretations, yet I feel that for the most 
part he leaves these undeveloped. Certainly this latter task was not the author's 
expressed intention and thus I am not criticizing as much as I am expressing my regrets 
that he did not in some way pursue these themes a bit further. Perhaps it is in the 
present exchange that he can share with us his thoughts. 
 
While Obeyesekere's analysis of ethicization is certainly compelling, as a scholar of 
religion, and one who appreciates the analytical-critical as much as the 
phenomenological-hermeneutical, the question I found myself returning to concerns the 
"why." That is to say, I'm interested in why human communities posit that which is 
immanently counter-experiential. Let me be as clear as possible. I recognize that I 
inhabit a demythologized world. The Enlightenment prejudice, with both its pros and 
cons, is not lost on me. However, I am willing to suggest that life after death, either in 
an ancestral (or otherwise) realm without rebirth, or an ethicized (or not) rebirth is not 
immediately evident in the way that fire burns a body is. Taking into account 
Obeyesekere's suggestion that "whether we are talking of the Greeks, the Buddhists, or 
the Amerindians, the central validating principle of religious experience is a form of 
'empiricism"'(286), I am willing to propose that regardless of cultural frame the human 
condition is empirically, experientially, and (most significantly) irreversibly mortal. 
Obeyesekere's documentation of rebirth narratives from such disparate cultures as the 
Amerindian, Buddhist, and Greek reflects as much: the human animal has anxieties 
concerning its ultimate fate precisely because a narcissistic injury of the first magnitude 
is its fate. In other words, that there are eschatologies across cultures that share a 
common logic - a result of scholarly thick description and nomological analysis - 
pressingly invites a theory as to why. I want to piece together a few fragments from 
Obeyesekere's text that suggest an answer.  
 
This, however, is where the issue of Orientalism, and by a certain extension 
reductionism, often comes into play. How dare I suggest a "non-religious" point to 
which such various eschatologies may be reduced! But here I believe I follow 
Obeyesekere's suggestions: "Areal barriers can be broken only by comparative 
analyses and theoretical thinking, and comparison is possible only if one moves away 
from the purely substantive domain to delineating structures, ideal types, or 
topographical models and their transformations"(xx, emphasis added). While 
Obeyesekere persuasively gives us the models and the logic of their transformations, I 
want to imagine that which motivates the models in the first place, a pursuit that not 
only follows Obeyesekere's lead but also comments upon the recent methodological 
debates in religious studies.  
 
The past couple of decades in the study of religion have witnessed what could be 
considered a crisis. To this day, scholars continue to debate the raison d'être of the 
field. What is it that we scholars of religion study and how do we study it? The terms of 
this debate typically resolve to one hotly contested topic - to reduce or not to reduce. 
Those following the phenomenological-hermeneutical approach contend that the 
reductive fails to open up to sui generis phenomena that do not by definition resonate 
with the merely historical. By extension, the other's voice and religious experience is 
there not to be explained away, but rather understood and interpreted. While I believe I 
can appreciate the concern -theoretical imperialism is no more appealing than no theory 
at all - to a certain extent this approach presupposes a fundamental philosophical 
position. As I see it, the stance that criticizes those who reduce ultimately rests on an 
understanding of authorship: only the other authors and thus authorizes her or his 
position. Precisely in this regard, notice that a leading text in phenomenology is titled, 
Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology (Husserl 1960). In other 
words, the position that endorses only the nuanced description of the insider's position 
privileges a certain Cartesian legacy: it presupposes that the other is transparent to her 
or his motivations and intentions - cogito ergo sum. The putative self-evidence of such a 
position seems to me to be Eurocentric in its own right.
3 
In this regard, the critical 
tradition in religious studies contests precisely the issue of authorship. Why privilege the 
insider's voice when the point of departure for the critical study of religion often 
presupposes a hermeneutics of suspicion? Indeed, the phenomenological-
hermeneutical (and some would suggest crypto-theological) decides in advance that 
religion and religious experience is not:  
 
the result of alienation from socioeconomic relations (Marx and Engels), 
that religion is an illusory practice of wish fulfillment (Freud), that religious 
practices and stories symbolically deny the contingency and transience of 
life and human institutions (Bloch 1994), that religion is but one species of 
anthropomorphism (Guthrie 1993, 1996), or that religion is but an 
evolutionarily developed mechanism (Burkert 1996). (McCutcheon2001: 
126-127)  
But is this in fact the case? And more importantly, how would we know it without 
presupposing precisely what the critical tradition finds question worthy? 
I want to say immediately that I do find the phenomenological-hermeneutical an 
essential aspect of the study of other cultures and religions. To be sure, the critical next 
step can only be taken when a thorough appreciation for and understanding of the 
other's traditions have been reached. As difficult as this may be, and at times the other 
may appear insurmountable in her or his alterity, I believe as scholars we must take the 
next step, as unpopular as this may make us. After all, "our scholarship," Russell T. 
McCutcheon argues, "is not constrained by whether or not devotees recognize its value; 
it is not intended to celebrate or enhance normative, dehistoricized discourses, but, 
rather, to contextualize and redescribe them as human constructs"(2001: 139). In fact, 
and as McCutcheon points out, there is often a political element at stake:  
 
Through their use of the tools of nuanced description, their effort to recover 
authentic meaning, and their disdain for trasgressive questions, scholars of 
religion risk uncritically reproducing their subjects' claims of autonomy and 
authority - whether that authority sanctions politically liberal or conservative 
actions. (2001: 133)  
 
As for Obeyesekere's material, it would indeed seem that certain forms of ancestor 
worship and their concomitant eschatologies serve precisely the purpose of socio-
political conservatism: "Those buried thus may be invoked by their descendents to 
occasionally appear in their physical forms as the 'incarnate dead' to judge the 
community and demand that social norms be upheld (22, emphasis added). While I 
don't want to pursue the politics of rebirth here, I do want to historicize, humanize the 
discourse concerning eschatology and soteriology. As mentioned above, I want to do 
this through a psychoanalytic consideration.  
 
Throughout Imagining Karma, Obeyesekere drops hints regarding the psychoanalytic 
interpretation of his data. For instance, he suggests that the Buddha's pre-awakening 
ascesis was motivated by guilt as much as it was by a search for "truth." The orthodox 
interpretation notwithstanding, Obeyesekere suggests that we view this behavior in 
terms of self-punishment: "By punishing himself he is trying to expiate the guilt he feels 
for violating powerful family values and ideals of filial and domestic piety"(157). This 
sounds faintly familiar. Though Obeyesekere finds J. M. Masson's work 
methodologically impossible to substantiate, the latter has similarly suggested that the 
historical Buddha suffered depression: the Buddha defensively displaced his own 
depression onto the outside world (Masson 1980: 6-7). In addition to the Buddha's 
ostensible guilt, Obeyesekere alludes to the work of Jacques Lacan and Melanie Klein 
on the pre-oedipal fragmented body in his discussion of Empedocles, a fragmented 
body that he claims is "found in virtually all mythological traditions in their 
representations of monsters"(221). With respect to Plotinian philosophy, he suggests 
that the daimon acts much like "the Freudian conscience"(294). There are many other 
such brief references to psychoanalytic theory (e.g., 108, 127,172, 220).  
 
I find these suggestions as interesting and tantalizing as they are seemingly 
undeveloped (again, I recognize that a psychoanalytic reading of eschatologies is not 
Obeyesekere's immediate task). All the same, by incorporating these allusions 
Obeyesekere invites us to pursue questions of deep motivation. In this regard, 
Obeyesekere notes in passing, "Buddhists extolled the renunciatory ideal that leads to 
salvation, but, in the spirit of Vedic thought, they also believed that the household life 
was necessary and desirable for those not driven by soteriological aspirations"(l 12, 
emphasis added). Elsewhere he writes, "kinship structures do not exclusively determine 
rebirth affiliations; personal wishes and motivations often complicate the picture"(356, 
emphases added). Let us pause here and note Obeyesekere's language.  
I find "those not driven by soteriological aspirations" and "personal wishes and 
motivations*' suggestive. Indeed, the very idea of "driven" recalls Freud's notion of 
compulsion (if not the drive theory itself), as does "wishes" Freud's theory of illusion. 
That the householder life is fine for those not driven by soteriological aspirations begs 
the question of just why certain people have these drives and not others. Of course, we 
are precluded from the case histories of the Buddha and his contemporaries, not to 
mention Vedic-age persons in general. I would all the same suggest that we imagine 
along these lines; after all, "although all experiments are imaginary (that is, constructed 
in the imagination), experimentation in the human sciences is exclusively imaginary 
rather than partially constructed and tested in a laboratory"(18). Pursuing our 
imaginative path then, we need to focus not only on those who have the soteriological 
aspiration and wish, but also those who do not: What are the aspirations for those 
without such aspiration? For instance, "Laypersons may be incapable of achieving 
salvation in this life, but they can achieve it in some future one. Thus the wish to 
eventually escape... is part of the long-term soteriological motivations of most 
people"(144). With specific reference to Hindu religious traditions, Wendy Doniger 
similarly notes that there is a "general dichotomy between the moksha-oriented, 
Vedantic level of Hindu society and the rebirth-oriented 'transactional' level.... Some 
Indians have a positive attitude to... the world of maya, while others have a negative 
attitude"(0'Flaherty 1980: 47). Yet does this not seem a bit odd if this is "truly" a life of 
suffering and illusion (maya)? Soteriology aside, what do we make of the motivations 
driving the eschatologies? In the case of the Balinese data, Obeyesekere points out that 
the neonate is often identified as the father of the father, or, the grandfather returned 
(46); certainly, this is no accident. That there are these different systems that share a 
common logic is demonstrated in Obeyesekere's text; we now ask, why?  
 
Given our universal psychobiology (Obeyesekere 1990: 101), and cultural 
psychological theory notwithstanding (S. Kurtz 1992, A. Roland 1988, 1996, R. 
Shweder, 1991), I want to propose two, perhaps related, theories that can guardedly 
account for the material at hand. Anticipating what is to follow, I suggest that 
Obeyesekere's psychobiology entails not only the universal vicissitudes of familial life 
along with the negotiations regarding the expressions of sex and aggression, but also 
the universally existential concern - death. I of course do not pretend that this thesis is 
new, nor should it seem all that shocking. I do, all the same, sense that this most 
fundamental of existential concerns motivates (perhaps obviously) much of the 
discussion concerning eschatology and soteriology. I believe Obeyesekere himself 
encourages such a consideration: "the goal of the human sciences is not only to 
simplify the world but also to understand its complexities and existential predicaments" 
(120, emphasis added). Accordingly, I suggest here that the existential psychoanalysis 
of Ernest Becker along with the general object-relations psychoanalysis of Sudhir Kakar 
lends suggestive insight into the material at hand.
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It seems to me that the overwhelming motivation/aspiration of eschatologies and 
soteriologies is the denial of death (Buddhism is of course a curious departure from 
such a denial, or is it?). Indeed, "a rebirth eschatology has an inescapable logical form: 
the individual at death has to be reborn in the human world"(15). Unmistakably then, 
eschatology in its most elementary logic denies precisely irreversible mortality. 
Obeyesekere notes in this regard that even Socrates in his practice of death prepared 
himself for anything but death: "Socrates is fearless and confident because, as a 
philosopher, his very lifestyle is given to 'practicing death.' This training for death is in 
reality the cultivation of the soul, rendering it pure and recognizing its immortality"(250, 
emphasis added). I believe such a denial of death also accounts for the denial of 
paternity, a historically heated topic especially in regard to the Trobrianders. Can we not 
imagine that instead of an ignorance regarding paternity, there is a wish, deep or 
otherwise, to see conception as driven by something other than the biological, itself an 
all-too-pressing reminder of mortality?
5  
 
Here then is where I find Becker's existential psychoanalysis helpful: the human 
animal's motivations rest not only in the drives of sex and aggression but also in the 
adamant denial of mortality. For instance, Becker suggests that the horror of the primal 
scene has nothing to do with jealousy and rivalry. Rather, in his Rankian approach, he 
argues that parental intercourse threatens a displaced oedipal project, a project that has 
everything to do with self-constitution: "The Oedipal project is the flight from passivity, 
from obliteration, from contingency: the child wants to conquer death by becoming the 
father of himself, the creator and sustainer of his own life"(1973: 36). However, once the 
individual recognizes her or his own incapacity for such self-constitution the desire is 
then displaced onto the omnipotent parent. Yet, if the parent is seen in the animal act of 
copulation, the model is degraded and thus ruined: "When they themselves [parents] do 
not transcend the body in their most intimate relations, the child must experience some 
anxious confusion"(1973: 44). When such a theory is applied to Obeyesekere's data, 
the Balinese neonatal identity (not to mention other forms of ancestor rebirth predicated 
on the child being the grandfather reincarnated) becomes an expected move in the 
causa sui project: the existential Oedipus desires to be the father of the father. That is to 
say, if one's own causa sui project is dashed by reliance upon a fallible other, this 
dilemma is ultimately solved when the offspring turns out to be the source of the source. 
Whatever the socio-political ramifications of ancestor reincarnation, the psychological 
payoff undeniably rests in the denial of death. 
 
 
Along with this denial of death, which is simultaneously a fear of death, we also 
have, as Becker points out, a denial of the contingent. If religions provide worlds of 
meaning (among other things) as Geertz contends, I suggest that such worlds exclude 
the contingent: meaning and contingency are antithetical. Imagining karma, in this 
sense, means imagining worlds without contingency, that is, chance. Karma is an 
airtight theodicy. Obeyesekere quotes Plotinus to this effect: "It is not an accident that 
makes a man a slave; no one is prisoner by chance; every bodily outrage has its due 
cause"(295-296). There is a reason for everything; the aleatory has not the final say - 
meaning triumphs. In other words, a world with death entails a world of chance and 
chance entails the death of both meaning and the causa sui project. I thus propose that 
Becker's existential psychoanalysis provides a compelling theoretical explanation of 
these disparate rebirth theories: human narcissism disallows the contingent and chancy 
life of irreversible mortality.  
 
But this isn't the end of the story. We must now revisit an issue raised earlier: who 
chooses to pursue moksha and who chooses to put it off for another day? This question 
arises especially when we start considering soteriologies as opposed to eschatologies. 
In other words, a purely eschatological consideration poses not descriptions of final 
things; rather, it simply suggests that the course of events continuously moves on in its 
orderly way (212-213). The soteriologies Obeyesekere analyzes, on the other hand, 
address the conditions of the last things. As he points out, the Upanishadic and 
Plotinian share a sense of merging with the One, a true historical connection or no. I 
believe it is with regard to these imagined soteriologies that we see individual 
aspirations playing themselves out. Perhaps guilty of a certain reduction, I want to 
imagine that the object-relations psychoanalysis of Sudhir Kakar accounts for one's 
soteriological pursuit, or lack thereof. I will suggest here in abbreviated form a 
hypothesis that I detail at length elsewhere.
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Kakar proposes that the "essential psychological theme of Hindu culture is the 
polarity of fusion and separation"(1981: 34). That is to say, the Hindu must negotiate 
her or his fear of separation from the (m)other as well as fear of identity-annihilation in 
her overwhelming presence. This predicament he suggests is not only Hindu in nature, 
but is rather universal (1981: 34). Reflecting such universality, Kakar argues, "the 
psychological importance of the theme of fusion and separation lies in its intimate 
relation to the human fear of death"(1981: 35). Significantly, this is Becker's 
fundamental argument with regard to the causa sui project's emotional and conceptual 
ambivalence (1973: 115-123). For Becker, the entire project comes down to the 
individual's predicament between either standing out (and thus alone) or being elided in 
participation with the grandiose other. Kakar, for his part, suggests, as does Doniger, 
that the Vedanta (and the concomitant Upanishads) encourages an identity-eliding 
fusion, a fusion reflected in the popular Atman-Brahman monism most represented by 
the Vedanta mantra, Tat Tvam Asi (That You Are). Considering this identification 
outside the traditional philosophical discussion, we curiously come across repeated 
instances of an ambivalence, that is, a mysterium tremendum et fascinons. This of 
course is most famously represented by Arjuna's response to Krishna's epiphany in the 
eleventh chapter of the Bhagavad Gita. There Arjuna is thrilled and terrified by the 
overwhelming presence of the Other.
7 
We find this same ambivalence repeated in the 
Devimahatmya and the Chaitanya-charitamrita} Such ambivalence directly reflects 
Kakar's essential psychological theme. Significantly, I believe, the later Hindu devotional 
tradition displaces precisely the early identity thesis of the Upanishads. In other words, if 
the Upanishadic soteriology falls on the fusion side of things, leading to many 
fascinatingly terrifying experiences of the other's totality, then we seem to have a 
psychoanalytic account for the emergence of the devotional tradition whose 
quintessence I suggest is found in the Bhagavata Purana 's viraha bhakti, or 'love-in-
separation' - methinks the gopis dost suffer too much. The gopis don't want Krishna (in 
his totality) to appear because this would ultimately elide their individual identities, an 
expected response to the identity shattering epiphanies found in the other texts. Thus 
reflecting the vicissitudes of identity and alterity, I suggest that soteriologically motivated 
Hindus (and others?) search for an elision of identity while the eschatologically 
motivated bhaktas are content to enjoy their identity in devotion to a delimited other, 
satisfied to put off such Vedantic apotheosis. Who chooses which depends on the 
individual's psychosocial development; the decision is not merely philosophical in 
nature.  
 
This then is where I come to my conclusion. I thank Professor Obeyesekere for his 
painstaking documentation and comparison of these various rebirth traditions. I certainly 
would not have had the academic temerity to travel so far afield. That being said, and 
knowing Obeyesekere's penchant for psychoanalytic theorizing, I hope that he may 
comment on possible explanations for why humans consistently and cross-culturally 
devise such complex theories regarding the immortality of the, faute de mieux, "soul." 
That these Amerindian, Buddhist, and Greek traditions elaborate upon the soul's 
journey through many incarnations, with or without ethicization or soteriological 
motivations, is no longer in doubt. What interests me, as a scholar of religion on 
occasion willing to transgress the taboo against reduction, is the question of why. If our 
pursuits are humanistic in the sense that McCutcheon sees it (as opposed to Mircea 
Eliade), then I believe Obeyesekere has given us plenty of material to imagine a theory 
regarding the desire for either multiple births or escape from such births.
9 
Here I suggest 
that the existential psychoanalysis of Ernest Becker along with the object-relations 
psychoanalysis of Sudhir Kakar provide us with compelling explanations of these 
motivations. I recognize that these are not the only possible lenses through which to 
view this material. All the same, they are lenses available to public consensus as well 
as dissent. I certainly don't pretend to pose these questions to Obeyesekere as if he 
himself were unaware of these issues. Rather, I hope my reflections will invite his 
response in what I find to be a most fascinating discussion pertaining to a seemingly 
universal human phenomenon. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Endnotes 
 
1 
In this regard, see the series of articles under the general heading of "Who Speaks for 
Hinduism?" Journal of the American Academy of Religion 68, no. 4 (2000): 705-835.  
 
2 
Throughout the text I will place in parentheses only the page references when referring 
to Gananath Obeyesekere, Imagining Karma: Ethical Transformation in Amerindian, 
Buddhist, and Greek Rebirth (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).  
 
3 
Note in this regard that a primary epistemological position within many South Asian 
traditions presupposes that the subject is deluded by both maya and karmic 
impressions from prior lives, a non-Cartesian point of departure.  
 
4
1 recognize of course that Obeyesekere problematizes the language of the self: "The 
French analyst Pontalis asks whether the concept of 'self can be exported elsewhere 
even though the French language has an equivalent in soi. I agree; 'self theories, 
whether Kohut's or Mead's, must result in too radical an appropriation of other minds 
into Anglo-American language games and life-forms," The Work of Culture: Symbolic 
Transformation in Psychoanalysis and Anthropology (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1990), xx. This being said, I believe we can cautiously use "self in a culturally 
nuanced way as do Kakar (1981), Roland (1988,1996) and Kurtz (1992).  
 
5 
Here we could perhaps point to Maurice Bloch's thesis of "rebounding violence" in the 
sense that ritual often entails the violent subordination of the merely biological in lieu of 
an emerging symbolic realm that denies precisely the transience of life. See Maurice 
Bloch, Prey Into Hunter: The politics of religious experience (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992).  
 
6 
Thomas B. Ellis, "I Love You, I Hate You: Hindu Devotion and the Vicissitudes of 
Object Representation" (unpublished). 
  
7 
According to Barbara Stoller Miller's translation, Arjuna, in the presence of Krishna's 
epiphany, states: "I am thrilled, and yet my mind trembles with fear at seeing what has 
not been seen before"( 11:45); see The Bhâgavad-Gïta, trans. Barbara Stoller Miller 
(New York: Bantam, 1986), 107.  
 
8 
In the Devlmähätmaya, we find the epiphany of the goddess described as both 
saumya (gentle) and ghora (terrible). According to Swami Jagadiswarananda's 
translation: "Armed with sword, spear, club, discus, conch, bow, arrows, sling and iron 
mace, you are terrible (and at the same time) you arep/e?aj/wg"(Chennai: Sri 
Ramakrishna Math, 1953), 18-19. Thomas B. Coburn likewise translates: "Terrible with 
your sword and spear, likewise with cudgel and discus, with conch and bow, having 
arrows, sling, and iron mace as your weapons, Gentle, more gentle than other gentle 
ones," Encountering the Goddess: A Translation of the Devi-Mähätmya and a Study of 
Its Interpretation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 37. According to 
David Haberman's translation of the Madhya-lïla in the Chaitanya-charitämrita, 
Ramanda repeats Arjuna's condition in the epiphany: "Seeing this, Ramanda became 
faint with ecstasy, was unable to control his body, and fell to the ground. The Lord 
touched him with his hand and thereby caused him to regain consciousness. Seeing the 
Lord once again in the guise of a renouncer, he was amazed," Textual Sources for the 
Study of Hinduism, ed. W. D. O'Flaherty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 
158. 
  
9 
McCutcheon notes in this regard: "It is with deep irony then, that I now find myself 
seemingly in agreement with Mircea Eliade when he suggested... that the scholar of 
religion 'is destined to play an important role in contemporary cultural life'.... Eliade, 
however, saw this role as the therapeutic recovery of archaic meanings housed in 
supposedly timeless myths and rituals. This is nothing other than the regressive - and 
not trasgressive - politics of nostalgia. Instead, I side with Mack and Lincoln in 
recommending for scholars of religion the role of critic, rather than Eliade's role of 
savior, for our work is carried out within the material contestations of history rather than 
in the mists of primordial time," Critics Not Caretakers: Redescribing the Public Study of 
Religion (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 142. 
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